

CIVIL COVER SHEET

11-207
RWR

JS-44
(Rev. 1/05 DC)

I (a) PLAINTIFFS

The Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon

(b) COUNTY OF RESIDENCE OF FIRST LISTED PLAINTIFF (EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES) Polk County, OR

(c) ATTORNEYS (FIRM NAME, ADDRESS, AND TELEPHONE NUMBER)

Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber LLP
1801 K St NW, Suite 411L
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 775-4500

DEFENDANTS

Ken Salazar, in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior; Larry Echo Hawk, in his official capacity as Assistant Secretary - Indian Affairs, United States Department of the Interior; Stanley M. Speaks, in his official capacity as Regional Director, Northwest Region, Bureau of Indian Affairs; United States Department of the Interior

COUNTY OF RESIDENCE OF FIRST LISTED DEFENDANT (IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)

NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED

Case: 1:11-cv-00284
Assigned To : Roberts, Richard W.
Assign. Date : 2/1/2011
Description: Admn. Agency Review

II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION
(PLACE AN x IN ONE BOX ONLY)

1 U.S. Government Plaintiff

2 U.S. Government Defendant

3 Federal Question (U.S. Government Not a Party)

4 Diversity (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in item III)

III CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (PLACE AN x IN ONE BOX FOR PLAINTIFF AND ONE BOX FOR DEFENDANT) **FOR DIVERSITY CASES ONLY!**

	PTF	DFT		PTF	DFT
Citizen of this State	<input type="radio"/> 1	<input type="radio"/> 1	Incorporated or Principal Place of Business in This State	<input type="radio"/> 4	<input type="radio"/> 4
Citizen of Another State	<input type="radio"/> 2	<input type="radio"/> 2	Incorporated and Principal Place of Business in Another State	<input type="radio"/> 5	<input type="radio"/> 5
Citizen or Subject of a Foreign Country	<input type="radio"/> 3	<input type="radio"/> 3	Foreign Nation	<input type="radio"/> 6	<input type="radio"/> 6

IV. CASE ASSIGNMENT AND NATURE OF SUIT

(Place a X in one category, A-N, that best represents your cause of action and one in a corresponding Nature of Suit)

<input type="radio"/> A. Antitrust <input type="checkbox"/> 410 Antitrust	<input type="radio"/> B. Personal Injury/ Malpractice <input type="checkbox"/> 310 Airplane <input type="checkbox"/> 315 Airplane Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 320 Assault, Libel & Slander <input type="checkbox"/> 330 Federal Employers Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 340 Marine <input type="checkbox"/> 345 Marine Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 350 Motor Vehicle <input type="checkbox"/> 355 Motor Vehicle Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 360 Other Personal Injury <input type="checkbox"/> 362 Medical Malpractice <input type="checkbox"/> 365 Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 368 Asbestos Product Liability	<input checked="" type="radio"/> C. Administrative Agency Review <input type="checkbox"/> 151 Medicare Act Social Security: <input type="checkbox"/> 861 HIA ((1395ff) <input type="checkbox"/> 862 Black Lung (923) <input type="checkbox"/> 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g) <input type="checkbox"/> 864 SSID Title XVI <input type="checkbox"/> 865 RSI (405(g) Other Statutes <input type="checkbox"/> 891 Agricultural Acts <input type="checkbox"/> 892 Economic Stabilization Act <input type="checkbox"/> 893 Environmental Matters <input type="checkbox"/> 894 Energy Allocation Act <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 890 Other Statutory Actions (If Administrative Agency is Involved)	<input type="radio"/> D. Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction Any nature of suit from any category may be selected for this category of case assignment. *(If Antitrust, then A governs)*
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<input type="radio"/> E. General Civil (Other)	OR	<input type="radio"/> F. Pro Se General Civil	
Real Property <input type="checkbox"/> 210 Land Condemnation <input type="checkbox"/> 220 Foreclosure <input type="checkbox"/> 230 Rent, Lease & Ejectment <input type="checkbox"/> 240 Torts to Land <input type="checkbox"/> 245 Tort Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 290 All Other Real Property Personal Property <input type="checkbox"/> 370 Other Fraud <input type="checkbox"/> 371 Truth in Lending <input type="checkbox"/> 380 Other Personal Property Damage <input type="checkbox"/> 385 Property Damage Product Liability	Bankruptcy <input type="checkbox"/> 422 Appeal 28 USC 158 <input type="checkbox"/> 423 Withdrawal 28 USC 157 Prisoner Petitions <input type="checkbox"/> 535 Death Penalty <input type="checkbox"/> 540 Mandamus & Other <input type="checkbox"/> 550 Civil Rights <input type="checkbox"/> 555 Prison Condition Property Rights <input type="checkbox"/> 820 Copyrights <input type="checkbox"/> 830 Patent <input type="checkbox"/> 840 Trademark Federal Tax Suits <input type="checkbox"/> 870 Taxes (US plaintiff or defendant) <input type="checkbox"/> 871 IRS-Third Party 26 USC 7609	Forfeiture/Penalty <input type="checkbox"/> 610 Agriculture <input type="checkbox"/> 620 Other Food & Drug <input type="checkbox"/> 625 Drug Related Seizure of Property 21 USC 881 <input type="checkbox"/> 630 Liquor Laws <input type="checkbox"/> 640 RR & Truck <input type="checkbox"/> 650 Airline Regs <input type="checkbox"/> 660 Occupational Safety/Health <input type="checkbox"/> 690 Other Other Statutes <input type="checkbox"/> 400 State Reapportionment <input type="checkbox"/> 430 Banks & Banking <input type="checkbox"/> 450 Commerce/ICC Rates/etc. <input type="checkbox"/> 460 Deportation	<input type="checkbox"/> 470 Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations <input type="checkbox"/> 480 Consumer Credit <input type="checkbox"/> 490 Cable/Satellite TV <input type="checkbox"/> 810 Selective Service <input type="checkbox"/> 850 Securities/Commodities/Exchange <input type="checkbox"/> 875 Customer Challenge 12 USC 3410 <input type="checkbox"/> 900 Appeal of fee determination under equal access to Justice <input type="checkbox"/> 950 Constitutionality of State Statutes <input type="checkbox"/> 890 Other Statutory Actions (if not administrative agency review or Privacy Act)

63

<input type="radio"/> G. Habeas Corpus/ 2255 <input type="checkbox"/> 530 Habeas Corpus-General <input type="checkbox"/> 510 Motion/Vacate Sentence	<input type="radio"/> H. Employment Discrimination <input type="checkbox"/> 442 Civil Rights-Employment (criteria: race, gender/sex, national origin, discrimination, disability age, religion, retaliation) *(If pro se, select this deck)*	<input type="radio"/> I. FOIA/PRIVACY ACT <input type="checkbox"/> 895 Freedom of Information Act <input type="checkbox"/> 890 Other Statutory Actions (if Privacy Act) *(If pro se, select this deck)*	<input type="radio"/> J. Student Loan <input type="checkbox"/> 152 Recovery of Defaulted Student Loans (excluding veterans)
<input type="radio"/> K. Labor/ERISA (non-employment) <input type="checkbox"/> 710 Fair Labor Standards Act <input type="checkbox"/> 720 Labor/Mgmt. Relations <input type="checkbox"/> 730 Labor/Mgmt. Reporting & Disclosure Act <input type="checkbox"/> 740 Labor Railway Act <input type="checkbox"/> 790 Other Labor Litigation <input type="checkbox"/> 791 Empl. Ret. Inc. Security Act	<input type="radio"/> L. Other Civil Rights (non-employment) <input type="checkbox"/> 441 Voting (if not Voting Rights Act) <input type="checkbox"/> 443 Housing/Accommodations <input type="checkbox"/> 444 Welfare <input type="checkbox"/> 440 Other Civil Rights <input type="checkbox"/> 445 American w/Disabilities-Employment <input type="checkbox"/> 446 Americans w/Disabilities-Other	<input type="radio"/> M. Contract <input type="checkbox"/> 110 Insurance <input type="checkbox"/> 120 Marine <input type="checkbox"/> 130 Miller Act <input type="checkbox"/> 140 Negotiable Instrument <input type="checkbox"/> 150 Recovery of Overpayment & Enforcement of Judgment <input type="checkbox"/> 153 Recovery of Overpayment of Veteran's Benefits <input type="checkbox"/> 160 Stockholder's Suits <input type="checkbox"/> 190 Other Contracts <input type="checkbox"/> 195 Contract Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 196 Franchise	<input type="radio"/> N. Three-Judge Court <input type="checkbox"/> 441 Civil Rights-Voting (if Voting Rights Act)

V. ORIGIN

1 Original Proceeding
 2 Removed from State Court
 3 Remanded from Appellate Court
 4 Reinstated or Reopened
 5 Transferred from another district (specify)
 6 Multi district Litigation
 7 Appeal to District Judge from Mag. Judge

VI. CAUSE OF ACTION (CITE THE U.S. CIVIL STATUTE UNDER WHICH YOU ARE FILING AND WRITE A BRIEF STATEMENT OF CAUSE.)
 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. The defendants' decision to acquire land in trust, proclaim a reservation, and declare land eligible for gaming was contrary to law.

VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION UNDER F.R.C.P. 23 DEMAND \$ _____ Check YES only if demanded in complaint

JURY DEMAND: YES NO

VIII. RELATED CASE(S) IF ANY (See instruction) YES NO If yes, please complete related case form.

DATE February 1, 2011 SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD *Lawrence M. [Signature]*

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING CIVIL COVER SHEET JS-44
 Authority for Civil Cover Sheet

The JS-44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replaces nor supplements the filings and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. Consequently a civil cover sheet is submitted to the Clerk of Court for each civil complaint filed. Listed below are tips for completing the civil cover sheet. These tips coincide with the Roman Numerals on the Cover Sheet.

- I. COUNTY OF RESIDENCE OF FIRST LISTED PLAINTIFF/DEFENDANT (b) County of residence: Use 11001 to indicate plaintiff is resident of Washington, D.C.; 88888 if plaintiff is resident of the United States but not of Washington, D.C., and 99999 if plaintiff is outside the United States.
- III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES: This section is completed only if diversity of citizenship was selected as the Basis of Jurisdiction under Section II.
- IV. CASE ASSIGNMENT AND NATURE OF SUIT: The assignment of a judge to your case will depend on the category you select that best represents the primary cause of action found in your complaint. You may select only one category. You must also select one corresponding nature of suit found under the category of case.
- VI. CAUSE OF ACTION: Cite the US Civil Statute under which you are filing and write a brief statement of the primary cause.
- VIII. RELATED CASES, IF ANY: If you indicated that there is a related case, you must complete a related case form, which may be obtained from the Clerk's Office.

Because of the need for accurate and complete information, you should ensure the accuracy of the information provided prior to signing the form.

ML

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

THE CONFEDERATED TRIBES)
OF THE GRAND RONDE)
COMMUNITY OF OREGON)
9615 Grand Ronde Road)
Grand Ronde, OR 97347)

Plaintiff,)

v.)

KEN SALAZAR)
in his official capacity as)
Secretary)
United States Department of the Interior)
1849 C Street NW)
Washington, DC 20240)

LARRY ECHO HAWK)
in his official capacity as)
Assistant Secretary – Indian Affairs)
United States Department of the Interior)
1849 C Street NW)
Washington, DC 20240)

STANLEY M. SPEAKS)
in his official capacity as)
Regional Director)
Northwest Region)
Bureau of Indian Affairs)
911 Northeast 11th Avenue)
Portland, Oregon 97232)

UNITED STATES)
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR)
1849 C Street NW)
Washington, DC 20240,)

Defendants)

Case: 1:11-cv-00284
Assigned To : Roberts, Richard W.
Assign. Date : 2/1/2011
Description: Admn. Agency Review

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY
AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

1. The Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon (“Grand Ronde”) challenges a December 17, 2010, Record of Decision (“ROD”) issued by the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior through his designee the Assistant Secretary – Indian Affairs. The challenged decision approved the acquisition of a parcel of land in Clark County, Washington (“the Parcel”), to be held in trust for the Cowlitz Indians; proclaimed the land a reservation for the Cowlitz; and declared the land to be eligible for gaming. The Secretary’s decision permits the Cowlitz to build a mega-casino and resort facility on the Parcel—despite the fact that the land is not located within the Cowlitz Tribe’s aboriginal territory, is not historically or culturally significant to the Cowlitz, and would be taken in trust for a tribe that was neither “recognized” nor “under federal jurisdiction” at the time prescribed by law. The decision below is thus unauthorized under the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 465, and violates the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2719; it also fails in multiple respects to comply with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 *et seq.* Moreover, the resulting casino—whose location was chosen for its proximity to the same gaming markets served by Grand Ronde’s casino, Spirit Mountain—will dramatically impair Grand Ronde’s ability to support itself, its members, and its future cultural integrity as a tribe. Grand Ronde therefore seeks declaratory and injunctive relief from the Secretary’s order.

NATURE OF THE ACTION

2. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the Constitution and laws of the United States, including but not limited to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 and 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. This action arises under federal law, including but not limited to the Indian

Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 465, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2719, and the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 *et seq.*

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

3. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1362.

4. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) and 5 U.S.C. § 703 because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims asserted occurred in this district and because Defendants may be found here.

5. Grand Ronde has a right to bring this action under 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 because Defendants have engaged in final agency action presenting an actual case or controversy for which Grand Ronde is entitled to relief and because the United States has consented to suit.

THE PARTIES

6. Plaintiff Grand Ronde is a federally recognized Indian tribe with a reservation located in western Oregon.

7. Defendant Ken Salazar is the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior (“DOI”). He acts through his designee the Assistant Secretary – Indian Affairs, and is sued in his official capacity.

8. Defendant Larry Echo Hawk is the Assistant Secretary – Indian Affairs of the U.S. Department of the Interior. Assistant Secretary Echo Hawk has responsibility for management of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) and is sued in his official capacity.

9. Defendant Stanley M. Speaks is the Regional Director for the BIA’s Northwest Region. If the ROD is implemented, he will be authorized to approve the conveyance document accepting the Parcel in trust for the Cowlitz. He is sued in his official capacity.

10. Defendant the U.S. Department of the Interior is an executive department of the United States and is headquartered at 1849 C Street NW, Washington, DC 20240.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

I. The Present Dispute

11. Grand Ronde, which has more than 5000 members, comprises twenty-seven tribes and bands that have lived in their ancestral homelands in western Oregon, northern California, and southern Washington for more than 12,000 years. Although Grand Ronde's federal recognition was terminated by the Federal Government in 1954, Grand Ronde has remained a cohesive community since then and has worked to recover its lands and rebuild its government. In 1983 Grand Ronde's federal recognition was legislatively restored, and in 1988, 9,811 acres of Grand Ronde's original reservation, which was approximately 60,000 acres, were returned to the Tribe. Grand Ronde is still working to regain its original reservation lands and has recovered approximately 12,000 acres of that land.

12. Grand Ronde currently has a health clinic, an education and cultural facility, social services offices, a governance building, an adult foster care facility, an elder activity center, elder housing, and family housing located on its reservation. Grand Ronde's present-day reservation is located in the heart of the original Grand Ronde reservation.

13. Grand Ronde owns and operates Spirit Mountain Casino on its reservation, approximately 65 miles southwest of Portland, Oregon. The casino is the Tribe's primary source of revenue.

14. Grand Ronde uses Spirit Mountain's revenues to fund tribal services and programs, such as health care, education, housing, per capita, pension, and disability payments, and cultural programs.

15. The Cowlitz Indians live in western Washington. They maintain governmental offices and services in Cowlitz and Lewis Counties, within their aboriginal lands.

16. The Cowlitz were first federally acknowledged by the Secretary pursuant to 25 C.F.R. Part 83 in 2000. 65 Fed. Reg. 8436-01 (Feb. 18, 2000). That determination was challenged by the Quinault Indian Nation, and the acknowledgment was affirmed in 2002. 67 Fed. Reg. 607-01 (Jan. 4, 2002).

17. After their federal acknowledgment, the Cowlitz began seeking to have the Parcel acquired by the federal government and held in trust for the Cowlitz for the purposes of building a casino-resort complex and other facilities on the land.

18. The Parcel is a 151.87-acre plot in Clark County, Washington, near the city of La Center, Washington, west of Interstate 5 (I-5) at the NW 319th Street Interchange.

19. The Cowlitz chose the Parcel's location because it is a prime location for a casino-resort facility, based on its proximity to I-5 and the Portland-Vancouver metropolitan area.

20. The Parcel is approximately 25 miles from the Cowlitz administrative offices, located in Longview, Washington, and 50 miles away from tribal Housing and the Cowlitz Elders Program and Senior Nutrition Center, located in Toledo, Washington.

21. The Cowlitz's planned casino-resort complex on the Parcel includes: 134,150 square feet of gaming floor (3,000 video lottery terminals, 135 gaming tables, 20 poker tables); 355,355 square feet of restaurant and retail facilities and public space; 147,500 square feet of convention and multi-purpose space; an 8-story, 250-room hotel; and 7,250 parking spaces. The building footprint of the casino-resort facility would be almost 800,000 square feet.

22. The Cowlitz's plans for the Parcel also include a 20,000 square foot Tribal government office building, a 12,000 square foot cultural center, and approximately 16 elder housing units.

23. In January 2002, the Cowlitz submitted an application to the Secretary to have the Parcel taken into trust for the Cowlitz. A second amended application was submitted in June 2006.

24. In 2005, the Cowlitz submitted a site-specific Class II tribal gaming ordinance, along with a request for a “restored lands” opinion, to the National Indian Gaming Commission (“NIGC”). (A trust acquisition that constitutes a “restoration of lands” to a tribe restored to federal recognition qualifies for one of the limited exceptions to IGRA’s prohibition of gaming on Indian lands acquired after 1988.) In order to meet the prerequisites for a restored lands opinion, the Cowlitz asserted in substance that they were unrecognized and not under federal jurisdiction from the early 1900s through 2002. See 25 C.F.R. § 292.7 (tribe must have lost its government-to-government relationship to qualify for the restored lands exception).

25. In 2005, NIGC issued the requested restored lands opinion, which—accepting the Cowlitz’s assertions—found in substance that the Cowlitz were neither recognized nor under federal jurisdiction throughout the Twentieth Century (including in 1934). The opinion concluded that the Cowlitz were therefore eligible for gaming under the restored lands exception of IGRA. That opinion formed the basis for NIGC’s approval of the Cowlitz’s gaming ordinance.

26. As required by the National Environmental Policy Act, the Secretary published a Notice of Intent in the Federal Register in November 2004, announcing the BIA’s intent to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) evaluating the Cowlitz’s proposed fee-to-trust transfer and inviting public comments. 69 Fed. Reg. 65,477 (Nov. 12, 2004). The draft EIS was distributed to federal, tribal, state, and local agencies, and made available to other interested parties in April 2006. See 71 Fed. Reg. 18767 (Apr. 12, 2006). The BIA then held public

hearings and received comments on the draft. After reviewing these comments, the agency revised its draft and published a Final EIS on May 30, 2008, which identified development of the proposed Cowlitz casino as the report's "Preferred Alternative." See 73 Fed. Reg. 31143 (May 30, 2008).

II. The Decision Below

27. On December 17, 2010, the Secretary, acting through the Assistant Secretary – Indian Affairs, issued the ROD on the Cowlitz's fee-to-trust application. The ROD announced the Secretary's decision to take trust title to the Cowlitz Parcel, proclaim the land a reservation for the Cowlitz, and declare the land to be eligible for gaming.

28. The Secretary explained that his authority to take trust title to the Parcel arises from Section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act ("IRA"), which provides that the Secretary may take land into trust "for the purpose of providing land for Indians." 25 U.S.C. § 465; see also 25 C.F.R. Part 151 (regulations governing the Secretary's authority pursuant to the IRA). The term "Indian" is defined by the IRA as "all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under federal jurisdiction." 25 U.S.C. § 479. As the Secretary acknowledged, the United States Supreme Court held in *Carcieri v. Salazar*, 129 S. Ct. 1058 (2009), that the phrase "now under federal jurisdiction" means that the Secretary may take land in trust only for those Indian tribes that were under federal jurisdiction when the IRA was enacted in 1934.

29. Relying on a concurring opinion in *Carcieri*, the Secretary construed "recognized" and "under federal jurisdiction" as "necessitating separate inquiries." ROD at 80 n.15. With respect to the "recognized" requirement, the Secretary stated that "the date of federal recognition did not affect the Secretary's authority under the IRA" because the term "now"

modifies the phrase “under federal jurisdiction” but not the phrase “recognized Indian tribe.” *Id.* at 89. Applying that interpretation, the Secretary concluded that the federal acknowledgment of the Cowlitz in *January 2002* constitutes “recognition” of the Cowlitz within the meaning of the IRA. *Id.* In light of his determination that a recognition as recent as 2002 suffices under the IRA, the Secretary declined to “reach the precise meaning of ‘recognized Indian tribe’ as used in the IRA” or to “ascertain whether the Cowlitz Tribe was recognized by the Federal Government in the formal sense in 1934.” *Id.* at 88. The Secretary nevertheless stated that, in his view, the word “recognized” in the IRA connotes “cognitive” or “quasi-anthropological” recognition and did not require recognition in any political or jurisdictional sense. *Id.* at 87.

30. With respect to the “under federal jurisdiction” requirement, the Secretary stated, first, that treaty negotiations between the United States and the Lower Cowlitz in 1855 constituted “sufficient evidence of federal jurisdiction as of at least 1855,” notwithstanding the fact that those negotiations failed to culminate in any treaty. ROD at 97. The Secretary then addressed whether the Cowlitz *remained* under federal jurisdiction in 1934, concluding that there was “no clear evidence” that the Cowlitz’s jurisdictional status was “terminated” or lost after the failed treaty negotiations. *Id.* The Secretary pointed to disparate federal government contacts with individual Cowlitz Indians as additional evidence that the Cowlitz remained “under federal jurisdiction” in 1934. For example, the Secretary noted that the Federal Government provided for certain “medical needs” of individual Cowlitz Indians, authorized expenditures for “goods at a local store” on behalf of individual Cowlitz Indians, and allotted land to individual Cowlitz Indians in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. ROD at 98, 99, 101.

31. The Secretary acknowledged that a DOI official stated in 1910 that the Cowlitz “have never had any recognition at the hands of the Government”; that the Secretary of the

Interior and other DOI officials stated in 1924 that the Cowlitz were “scattered” and “without any tribal organization”; and that the BIA commissioner stated in 1933 that the Cowlitz were “no longer in existence.” The Secretary dismissed those contemporaneous statements, however, on the ground that they were inconsistent with the DOI’s 2002 finding that the Cowlitz were “identified” as an American Indian “entity” for purposes of federal acknowledgment under 25 C.F.R. Part 83. ROD at 99 n.15, 100, 101 n.128. Although the Secretary also acknowledged the Cowlitz’s assertion (in seeking a restored lands opinion) that there in fact existed no “government-to-government relationship” between the Cowlitz and the federal government in 1934 (and throughout the Twentieth Century), he stated that the lack of such a relationship had no bearing on the question whether the Cowlitz were “under federal jurisdiction” in 1934 or whether the Cowlitz were “recognized” in the “cognitive” sense. *Id.* at 104, 106.

32. Addressing the other requirements set forth in 25 C.F.R. Part 151—the regulations governing the Secretary’s authority to take land in trust under the IRA—the Secretary reiterated that the Cowlitz needed the Parcel because their “government-to-government relationship with the United States had been terminated.” ROD at 106. He also stated that satisfying the Cowlitz’s unmet needs “hinges” on the development of a resort and casino on the land, and observed that the Parcel was “not too distant” from the Cowlitz’s current headquarters or from a site the Federal Government briefly considered reserving for the Cowlitz in 1854. *Id.* at 106, 111.

33. The Secretary next explained his decision to issue a reservation proclamation pursuant to the requirements set forth in the BIA Guidelines for Proclamations. Although the Guidelines state that a proclamation request “cannot be initiated” until the BIA has granted trust status to the land in question and has received a copy of the document transferring trust title, the

Secretary acceded to the Cowlitz's request to render a decision on the reservation proclamation "concurrently with the decision on the trust acquisition." ROD at 112. Next, in response to the Guidelines' requirement that the Secretary consider whether the trust land is "within the tribe's aboriginal territory, as defined by the Indian Claims Commission," the Secretary noted that the Parcel is "a short distance" from the land for which the Indian Claims Commission ("ICC") awarded compensation to the Cowlitz, and stated that the Cowlitz historically had a "significant historical presence . . . in the area in which the Cowlitz Parcel is located." *Id.* at 115.

34. The Secretary then turned to the Cowlitz's request that he authorize gaming on the Parcel. As the Secretary explained, IGRA generally prohibits gaming on lands acquired in trust after 1988. The Secretary concluded, however, that the Parcel—which would be acquired well after 1988—was eligible for gaming under IGRA's "initial reservation" exception. See 20 U.S.C. § 2719 (b)(1)(B)(ii). The implementing regulations of IGRA, 25 C.F.R. § 292.6, provide that, to qualify for the "initial reservation" exception, a tribe must have a "significant historical connection[]" to the land on which gaming will take place. In support of his determination that the Cowlitz satisfied that requirement, the Secretary concluded, without elaboration, that "the parcel is located within an area in which the Tribe has significant historical connections, as explained in detail in the Tribe's amended fee-to-trust application, the Tribe's request for a restored lands opinion, and the NIGC Restored Lands Opinion, which relies heavily on facts already adjudicated by the BIA in the Tribe's acknowledgment proceedings and by the ICC in the Tribe's land claim litigation." ROD at 116.

35. Last, the Secretary addressed the Final Environmental Impact Statement ("FEIS") prepared by the BIA to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 *et seq.* Environmental Impact Statements must "provide [a] full and fair

discussion of significant impacts” associated with a federal decision, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1, including its potential socioeconomic effects, *id.* §§ 1508.8, 1508.14; consider “the reasonable alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts or enhance the quality of the human environment,” *id.* § 1502.1; and discuss “appropriate mitigation measures” that would ameliorate the adverse effects of the proposed action, *id.* §§ 1502.14(f); 1502.16(h). The Secretary concluded that acquiring trust title to the Parcel and authorizing its development into a resort and casino complex is the Preferred Alternative.

36. In reaching that conclusion, the Secretary acknowledged that the BIA erred in its estimate of the economic effect that development of a casino on the Cowlitz Parcel would have on Grand Ronde’s Spirit Mountain Casino, but dismissed the significance of the negative impact on the Grand Ronde on the ground that it is unlikely that “Spirit Mountain will experience a long-term revenue decrease due to the introduction of a new Portland market casino.” ROD at 47. The Secretary further concluded, based on an assumption that Grand Ronde allocates 33% of net income from Spirit Mountain as per-capita payments to tribal members, that a reduction in revenue at Spirit Mountain would “not affect the ability of [Grand Ronde] to operate essential programs.” ROD at 48.

37. In support of the FEIS’s determination that the proposed casino is necessary to meet the Cowlitz’s needs, the Secretary stated that the BIA “relies” on the Cowlitz’s Business Plan and Unmet Needs Report and “believes that the Cowlitz Tribe accurately has reported the cost of and need for Tribal programs.” ROD at 31.

38. The DOI published its Notice of Final Agency Determination in the Federal Register on January 4, 2011. 76 Fed. Reg. 377-01 (Jan. 4, 2011).

III. Taking the Cowlitz Parcel In Trust, Proclaiming A Reservation, And Authorizing Gaming Would Significantly Harm Grand Ronde

39. The ROD constitutes a final agency determination to acquire approximately 151.87 acres of land into trust for the Cowlitz and to proclaim a reservation for the Cowlitz. The ROD also constitutes final agency authorization for the Cowlitz to build a casino on the Parcel pursuant to IGRA. Because the Department of the Interior published its Notice of Final Agency Determination in the Federal Register on January 4, 2011, see 76 Fed. Reg. 377-01 (Jan. 4, 2011), the ROD authorizes the Secretary to take trust title to the land on or after February 3, 2011, see 25 CFR part 151.12(b).

40. There is no dispute that, if the Secretary's decision is allowed to stand, the Cowlitz will build and operate a casino on the Parcel. The Cowlitz's gaming ordinance was approved by NIGC, and the Secretary has declared that the Cowlitz Parcel falls within the "initial reservation" exception to IGRA. As the Notice of Final Agency Determination unequivocally states, the Parcel "*will* be used for constructing and operating a gaming facility." 76 Fed. Reg. 377-01 (emphasis added).

41. The Secretary's decision will cause significant harm to Grand Ronde. Grand Ronde is a tribal government responsible for providing its members essential services such as public safety, public works projects, health care, education, employment, and housing. It relies on revenues from Spirit Mountain to provide all those services. Revenues from Spirit Mountain also support Grand Ronde's monitoring and protection of its tribal cultural resources and its wildlife protection and conservation efforts on tribal lands. In addition, Grand Ronde provides tribal members per capita, pension, disability, and supplemental social security payments, all of which similarly depend on Spirit Mountain revenue. Those payments themselves constitute an

essential government service, particularly for those tribal members who lack access to government services that are provided only on Grand Ronde's reservation.

42. All of those crucial government services would be directly, immediately, and significantly impaired by the certain and substantial loss of revenue that would result from establishing a casino on the Cowlitz Parcel. Nearly half of Spirit Mountain's revenues comes from visitors from the Portland metropolitan area, a market that the Cowlitz casino would also serve. Economic analyses show that the establishment of a casino on the Cowlitz Parcel would reduce revenues at Spirit Mountain by more than \$100 million in 2011 alone—a decrease of more than 41% from current yearly revenues. By authorizing gaming on the Cowlitz parcel, the Secretary's decision will substantially eviscerate the revenues generated by Grand Ronde's Spirit Mountain Casino.

43. U.S. Census and other data show that Grand Ronde tribal members have a relatively low median household income, a high percentage of families in poverty, and a high unemployment rate. Indeed, by each of those measures, Grand Ronde tribal members are worse off than the Cowlitz at present. Establishing a casino on the Cowlitz Parcel will only exacerbate that disparity.

44. Grand Ronde is one of the largest employers in Polk and Yamhill Counties, Oregon, providing much-needed jobs for tribal members as well as nonmembers from the local community. In addition to providing such jobs, Spirit Mountain and its employees support numerous local businesses. Establishment of a casino on the Parcel would cause a significant loss of jobs at Spirit Mountain and be detrimental to the surrounding community.

45. Spirit Mountain has been crucial to Grand Ronde's efforts to reverse the devastating impacts of the Allotment era and Grand Ronde's termination. For example, jobs at

Spirit Mountain and services provided by Spirit Mountain revenue have helped to buy back reservation land, draw displaced tribal members back to their aboriginal homeland, reduce reliance by those members on state and federal assistance, and enable the tribal government to provide crucial services to its members. Contrary to the purposes of the IRA and IGRA, the Secretary's decision therefore threatens the tribal self-sufficiency, self-governance, and self-determination of Grand Ronde.

46. Grand Ronde has cultural and historical connections to the north shore of the Columbia River, including Clark County. Indeed, that historical connection has been expressly recognized by treaty since 1855. Grand Ronde also considers Clark County, Washington, part of its Non-Treaty Homelands and Cultural Interest Lands, and Grand Ronde tribal members are buried on the north side of the Columbia River. Establishment of a reservation for the Cowlitz outside their aboriginal lands—and on lands to which Grand Ronde, by contrast, *has* a significant connection—would cause further injury to Grand Ronde.

COUNT I

(Declaratory and Injunctive Relief – Acquisition of Land in Violation of the Indian Reorganization Act)

47. Each of the foregoing allegations is incorporated herein by reference.

48. The Secretary lacked authority under the IRA to take trust title to the Cowlitz Parcel. Because the Cowlitz are not a “recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction,” within the meaning of 25 U.S.C. § 479, the Secretary's decision to take trust title to the Parcel was arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law, and in excess of his statutory authority under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

49. By defining “Indian” as “all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under federal jurisdiction,” 25 U.S.C. § 479, the IRA sets a crucial

limitation on the Secretary's authority to take land in trust for Indians. As the Supreme Court held in *Carcieri v. Salazar*, 129 S. Ct. 1058 (2009), the Secretary may take land in trust only for those Indian tribes that were "under federal jurisdiction" when the IRA was enacted in 1934. By parity of reasoning, the IRA likewise requires that the Indian tribe was "recognized" in 1934.

50. None of the evidence relied upon by the Secretary in the ROD demonstrates that the Cowlitz were either "recognized" or "under federal jurisdiction" in 1934 as required by the IRA. There was no ongoing government-to-government relationship between the United States and the Cowlitz as a group or tribe or any assertion of authority by the United States over the Cowlitz. Any intermittent contact that might have occurred between the Federal Government and individual Indians of Cowlitz descent is insufficient to constitute recognition of the Cowlitz as an Indian tribe or demonstrate that the Cowlitz were under federal jurisdiction in 1934.

51. The United States did not recognize the Cowlitz from at least the late Nineteenth Century until 2002, when the Cowlitz first obtained recognition through the federal acknowledgment procedure set forth in 25 C.F.R. Part 83. Accordingly, the Cowlitz fail to meet the "recognized" requirement of the IRA.

52. The Cowlitz likewise fail to meet the "under federal jurisdiction" requirement of the statute. Although the United States attempted to negotiate a treaty with the Cowlitz in 1855, those negotiations ultimately failed. As of 1934, neither of the Cowlitz bands was granted a reservation, and no treaty was ever formed between either band and the Federal Government.

53. Indeed, to the extent that the Cowlitz were recognized or under federal jurisdiction at all, the Cowlitz plainly lost any such recognition or jurisdictional status prior to 1934. As the Secretary of the Interior himself noted in 1924, the Cowlitz were geographically dispersed and lacked any tribal organization whatsoever as of that date. The BIA has also

concluded that as of 1933—the year before the IRA was enacted—the Cowlitz had no existence as a communal entity and were not under Federal Government control. Those determinations—which the BIA has reiterated on multiple occasions—demonstrate that the Cowlitz were not recognized or under federal jurisdiction when the IRA was enacted in 1934.

54. What is more, the Cowlitz themselves have repeatedly asserted in filings with multiple governmental agencies that the United States lacked any government-to-government relationship with the Cowlitz and that the Cowlitz were administratively terminated by the U.S. government prior to 1934. Indeed, precisely by advancing that position, the Cowlitz secured approval of their gaming ordinance from NIGC. In particular, in its 2005 Restored Lands Opinion, NIGC expressly concluded that the Cowlitz were unrecognized in 1934. NIGC Op. at 7-8.

55. In addition, the Secretary's decision to take trust title to the Cowlitz Parcel and declare a reservation is arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law because it fails to adhere to the procedural and substantive requirements set forth in 25 CFR Part 151 and in the BIA's Guidelines for Proclamations. The Secretary did not properly analyze the Cowlitz's need for the acquisition or the distance of the Parcel from the Cowlitz's historical lands—both of which are required considerations under 25 CFR Part 151. Further, the Secretary violated the Guidelines for Proclamations by proclaiming a reservation on land that had not been transferred into trust status, and by disregarding the fact that the Parcel is not located within the Cowlitz's aboriginal territory.

COUNT II

(Declaratory and Injunctive Relief – Approval of Gaming in Violation of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act)

56. Each of the foregoing allegations is incorporated herein by reference.

57. IGRA and its implementing regulations place strict limits on use of Indian lands for gaming, especially on land acquired by the Secretary in trust for an Indian tribe after the enactment of the statute in 1988. Recently acquired land cannot qualify for gaming under IGRA's "initial reservation" exception unless a tribe demonstrates a "significant historical connection" to the land in question. 25 C.F.R. § 292.6.

58. The Secretary erroneously concluded that the Cowlitz has a significant historical connection to the Parcel sufficient to satisfy the "initial reservation" exception.

59. Because he did not specify the reasons for his decision, it is not entirely clear what historical evidence the Secretary believed to be persuasive. Nevertheless, the filings and other matter which the Secretary incorporated by reference—including the 1969 ICC opinion, the NIGC Restored Lands Opinion, the Cowlitz's request for a restored lands opinion, and the Cowlitz's fee-to-trust application—do not demonstrate that the Cowlitz ever had or maintained significant historical connections to the Parcel.

60. In fact, as determined by the ICC, the southernmost area of the Cowlitz's aboriginal land is at least 14 miles north of the Parcel. The ICC concluded that the Cowlitz did *not* have a valid claim to the land along the Lewis River, including the land on which the Parcel sits. See *Plamondon v. United States*, 21 Ind. Cl. Comm. 143 (1969).

61. Historically, the land on which the Parcel sits was exclusively occupied by other Indian tribes. The ICC concluded that "virtually all of the contemporary as well as the historical and anthropological reports have identified the aborigines on the Lewis River [the river closest to the Parcel] as belonging to other tribal groups." *Plamondon*, 21 Ind. Cl. Comm. at 146. Cowlitz Indians spoke a different language from the Indians who inhabited the area around the Parcel.

62. Although the 2005 NIGC Restored Lands Opinion, on which the Secretary relied in part, concluded that the Cowlitz maintained a sufficient historical connection to the Parcel land to satisfy a *different* IGRA exception (the “restored lands” exception), the opinion acknowledged that the Parcel itself was not “historically important” to the Cowlitz. NIGC Op. at 10, 11.

63. Furthermore, many of the facts relied upon by NIGC (and by the Cowlitz in their amended fee-to-trust application and their request for a restored lands opinion) are inaccurate and based upon misreadings of the historical evidence or on unreliable documentation. Nonetheless, even if those facts were accurate, they would not establish a “significant historical connection” to the Parcel. At most, they would establish transient and intermittent contact with the Parcel.

64. Moreover, NIGC relied heavily on the Cowlitz’s “exclusive use and occupancy” of land the southern boundary of which is *fourteen miles away* from the Parcel. In the relevant historical time periods, such distances would have been difficult to travel and would have been traveled only rarely. Use of land so removed from the Parcel cannot support the Secretary’s finding.

65. In short, the evidence relied on by the ROD, taken as a whole, does not show that the Cowlitz have a “significant historical connection” to the Parcel. To the contrary, the evidence of record conclusively proves just the opposite.

66. The Secretary’s decision that the Cowlitz Parcel qualifies for IGRA’s “initial reservation” exception is arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law.

COUNT III

(Declaratory and Injunctive Relief – Approval of Fee-To-Trust Application in Violation of the National Environmental Policy Act)

67. Each of the foregoing allegations is incorporated herein by reference.

68. The FEIS on which the Secretary relies violates NEPA's substantive and procedural requirements governing consideration of the environmental effects of a major federal action. The FEIS fails to accurately assess the impacts of the proposed action, including socio-economic impacts, meaningfully consider alternative actions, and properly evaluate mitigation measures, as required by NEPA and its implementing regulations. See, *e.g.*, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1(b), 1502.1, 1502.14(f), 1502.16(h).

69. The FEIS relies on untimely and prejudicial modifications of its "Purpose and Need" section, which were used to justify the Preferred Alternative and eliminate viable alternatives. The elimination of viable alternatives was prejudicial to the interests of Grand Ronde, because development of a Cowlitz casino at the alternative locations would cause Grand Ronde far fewer adverse effects than will development of a casino on the selected Parcel.

70. In response to public concern that the draft EIS's "Purpose and Need" section failed to adequately describe the Cowlitz's need for the proposed project in its final report, the BIA added to that section a statement that the Cowlitz had unmet financial needs of over \$113 million. FEIS 1-6. That figure was derived directly from the Cowlitz Tribal Business Plan, which the BIA appended to the FEIS. FEIS App. Vol. VII.E. The BIA also made the ability to satisfy that supposed need "the predominant criterion of the Proposed Action." FEIS Vol. IV.C-131 (Response #434-10).

71. The BIA's last-minute inclusion of the Cowlitz's unmet-needs assertion in the FEIS denied interested agencies and the public the opportunity to comment on either the

suitability of tying the proposed project's purpose and need to a specific dollar amount or the reasonableness of that amount. Having failed to make such commentary possible, the BIA therefore was unable to respond to comments in the FEIS, see 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4, or discuss "any opposing view which was not adequately discussed in the draft statement," see *id.* § 1503.9(b).

72. Those errors are especially problematic because the unmet-needs estimate significantly overstates the costs of many or all of the Cowlitz's desired programs and services, and the FEIS utterly fails to present any independent or objective analysis of that inflated figure. Addition of this figure also had the effect of removing several alternative development locations from serious consideration by the BIA, because the BIA determined that the alternatives would not "adequately meet the economic objectives and needs of the Tribal government." FEIS 2-36 to 2-40. Each of the eliminated alternatives, if selected, would have had substantially less adverse effect on Grand Ronde.

73. As the Secretary has acknowledged, ROD at 47, the FEIS also erred in its vast underestimation of the adverse impact of the proposed Cowlitz casino on the Grand Ronde. That error caused the BIA to fail to address measures necessary to mitigate the adverse effects of the Cowlitz casino project, as required by NEPA. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.14(f), 1502.16(h).

74. Relying on inaccurate and non-representative market data, rather than *actual* Spirit Mountain revenue, the FEIS estimated Spirit Mountain's 2005 revenue to be \$130,689,375, an amount nearly 30 percent lower than Spirit Mountain's actual 2005 revenue of \$184,595,967. FEIS App. Vol. VII.L 19. The FEIS then compared that erroneous 2005 estimate to a projection of Spirit Mountain's 2011 revenue (\$113,504,847), which, the FEIS asserted, accounted for losses due to the opening of the Cowlitz casino. FEIS App. Vol. VII.L 24. From

this comparison, the FEIS concluded that opening of the Cowlitz casino would cause only a \$17,184,528, or 13.15 percent, decrease in 2011 Spirit Mountain revenue. FEIS App. Vol. VII.L 24; FEIS 4.7-5.

75. That analysis failed to incorporate the FEIS's own conclusion that Spirit Mountain revenue will grow 5 percent annually, reaching \$166,900,000 in 2011. FEIS App. Vol. VII.L 20. It also inexplicably compared Spirit Mountain's projected 2011 revenue to the facility's estimated 2005 revenue. Had the FEIS instead compared Spirit Mountain's projected 2011 revenue to an amount that incorporated the casino's anticipated annual revenue growth, it would have forecasted a much larger—\$53,395,153, or nearly 32 percent—decline in Spirit Mountain's revenue as a result of the proposed Cowlitz development.

76. After receiving comments from the Grand Ronde explaining that the FEIS's analysis was severely flawed, the BIA made several corrections to its initial figures—and yet still grossly underestimated the negative impact the proposed Cowlitz casino would have on the Grand Ronde. For example, rather than accepting Grand Ronde's financial projections, the Secretary parsed Grand Ronde's revenue data, insisting that Spirit Mountain would suffer only a 25.9 percent reduction in gross revenue in 2011. ROD at 47. The Secretary then concluded that this loss would not impair essential tribal programs, because it could be offset by reductions in per-capita payments to tribe members. ROD at 48.

77. Aside from the incorrect calculation, that conclusion completely ignores the fact that per-capita payments *are* essential tribal services, especially for a restored tribe like Grand Ronde whose membership is widely dispersed outside of Grand Ronde. Without them, demand for social service programs on and off the reservation would skyrocket, and the Tribe easily could be rendered unable, for example, to provide the level of health care services that the

Secretary himself recognized as a “priority” when justifying his decision to accept, without question, the Cowlitz’s unmet-needs estimate. ROD at 32.

78. The FEIS is fundamentally flawed and does not comply with NEPA or its implementing regulations. The Secretary’s reliance on that report, and his own erroneous analysis of the impact of the proposed action on Grand Ronde, render his final decision arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law. The Secretary’s decision also reflects an inadequate effort to balance the BIA’s trust responsibility to the Cowlitz with its trust responsibility to Grand Ronde. See, e.g., *United States v. Mitchell*, 463 U.S. 206, 226 (1983).

REQUESTED RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that the Court enter judgment as follows:

79. Declaring that the Secretary’s decision to take trust title to the Cowlitz Parcel and to proclaim a reservation for the Cowlitz violates the IRA and associated regulations, and ordering the Secretary to set aside his approval of the Cowlitz’s fee-to-trust application and his reservation proclamation.

80. Declaring that the Cowlitz Parcel cannot be used to conduct gaming operations and issuing an order enjoining the Secretary from approving gaming on the Cowlitz Parcel.

81. Declaring that the BIA failed to comply with NEPA’s requirements and that the Secretary’s reliance on the FEIS was arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law, and ordering the Secretary to comply with NEPA by preparing a new or supplemental EIS consistent with NEPA’s requirements.


82. Issuing a Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction ordering that no official of the United States take the Cowlitz Parcel into trust until final judgment has been entered and all appeals exhausted.

83. Awarding Plaintiff costs, attorneys’ fees, and other expenses of this litigation.

84. Providing any such other relief that the Court may deem proper.

Dated: February 1, 2011

Respectfully Submitted,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Lawrence S. Robbins", is written over a horizontal line.

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