State

March 5, 2010: Angelina Mike (29 Palms Tribe) v. CA Franchise Tax Board

The California Court of Appeal has held that gaming distributions from a tribe to a tribal member who resides on a different reservation from the distributing tribe are taxable by the State. In tax year 2000, Ms. Mike received more than $385,000.00.

Dec. 23, 2009: Coaltion to Save Point Molate v. Contra Costa County BOS

This is a CEQA challenge on the recently approved MOU between the County and the Guidiville Band for the development of an off reservation casino at Point Molate in the Bay Area. The Coalition asserts that the County failed to perform the obligatory environmental process before rushing to sign an agreement for 12+million a year.

Jan. 2009: Kentucky vs. Interactive Gaming - Internet

In September 2008, Kentucky asked the courts to give it control of over 140 gambling-related domains in an attempt to block Kentucky residents from accessing the sites. A number of poker-related domains were named in the request. The first judge in the matter agreed, saying the sites named had to block access to their properties by Kentucky residents within 30 days or forfeit ownership of the domains. A quick and successful appeal stayed the order, leading to the current hearing in from of the State Supreme Court.

Station Casinos List of Creditors

While this is not a court ruling it is a significant list that brings to light the relationship of Station the developer and Attorneys that represent Tribes. This does present at the very least a question of conflict and ethics.

March 2007: San Pasqual v. CGCC

San Pasqual challenges the aggregate total of slot machine licenses in the 1999 tribal state compact as being too low.

Sept. 2007: Cates v. CGCC

The testimony is even more troubling given Qualset's assertion that the Commission accounts for all Fund contributions by performing "desk reviews" of all quarterly Fund contribution reports submitted by the tribes to insure the mathematical accuracy of the reports and the proper application of contribution rates in the Compact to the numbers reported by the tribes. We are at a loss to understand exactly how the Commission can possibly "insure the mathematical accuracy of the reports" when "net win" is a critical element in calculating the contribution amount, but the Commission purportedly does not know how "net win" is defined. It appears from the evidence presented that the Commission is simply 14 verifying the accuracy of mathematical calculations set forth in the reports submitted by the tribes without confirming that the numbers used to perform the calculations are those called for by the Compact. Needless to say, the Commission cannot collect and account for Fund contributions and collect and analyze the reports submitted by the tribes without knowing the definition of "net win."

Jan. 2007:Agua Caliente Petions for Rehearing

"The majority opinion applies a flawed approach to ascertaining federal law, ignoring the Supreme Court’s admonition to “defer to Congress” on tribal suit immunity, Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 760, and creating federal law not endorsed by Congress or the Supreme Court. This Court should grant this petition to correct those errors." Request is denied.

Dec. 2006:Agua Caliente v. FPPC ( CA Supreme Crt Ruling)

"In light of evolving United States Supreme Court precedent and the constitutionally significant importance of the state’s ability to provide a transparent election process with rules that apply equally to all parties who enter the electoral fray, we find the FPPC states the better case. Although concepts of tribal immunity have long-standing application under federal law, the state’s exercise of state sovereignty in the form of regulating its electoral process is protected under the Tenth Amendment and the guarantee clause. We therefore find that the Tribe lacks immunity from suit for its alleged failure to follow the PRA’s mandated reporting requirements. In so holding, we recognize that our abrogation of the sovereign immunity doctrine under these facts is narrow and carefully circumscribed to apply only in cases where California, through its Fair Political Practices Commission, sues an Indian tribe for violations of state fair political practice laws. We thus affirm the Court of Appeal judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with our ruling."

July 29, 2005: California Corporation Commissioner v First California Diversifed Fund - Tom Kelly

Bogus investment plan aimed at acknowledging new tribal governments for the development of urban Indian Casinos.

2004: FPPC v. Santa Rosa Indian Community

"The flaw in my colleagues’ decision is that it elevates the reserved powers of a state referred to (but not granted by) the Tenth Amendment above the powers delegated to the federal government by the Constitution. But the converse is true: Where the federal government, including the Supreme Court, exercises powers delegated to it by the Constitution, then the state has no reserved sovereign power to act in a contrary manner. For this reason, I cannot agree with my colleagues’ conclusion that “[t]he constitutional right of the State to sue 6 to preserve its republican form of government trumps the common law doctrine of tribal immunity.”1 Consequently, I would affirm the order granting the Tribe’s motion to quash."

1999: HERE v State of California - Proposition 5

In June of 1999, the California Supreme Court ruled on the HERE v. Davis case. This was the successful challenge to Proposition 5, a statutory ballot measure that included banked or house banked games. The Supreme Court held that: A banking game is one in which any person or entity takes on all comers, paying all winners and collecting from all losers. Under the Supreme Court’s analysis the purposes of Penal Code Section 330’s prohibition against banking games, even though the house does not own the bank. Further the Supreme Court held that: Article 4 Section 19 (e) of the California Constitution elevated the Penal Code Section 330 to a constitutional level. Accordingly the Legislature may not authorize any game that would constitute casino gambling.

1996: Western Telcon v Califoronia State Lottery

This case was decided by the California Supreme Court on June 24, 1996. The court held that the lottery's electronic keno game was not a lawful lottery game, but an illegal banked game that is prohibited in California. Hence the state lost the case although the ruling is favorable to the state's position in negotiating with Indian tribes. In non-banked games, including the lottery, the house collects a flat percentage. With a banked game the house is betting against the players and has a stake in the outcome. Although not strictly an Indian gaming case, it has ramifications over what is legal in California, hence what the tribes can operate.

May 1999: Kelly v. First Astri Corp

In 1999, banking games were illegal on and off of Indian Reservations. 3. “Banking game” As we have discussed, section 330 prohibits (among other things) the playing or carrying on, for money, of “any banking ... game played with cards....” In Western Telcon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at page 487, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 812, 917 P.2d 651, our high state court explained the definition of “banking game”: “When one party wagers simultaneously against a number of others on the outcome of a game, the scheme is a called a banked game or, in the words of our statute (§ 330), a ‘banking game.’ This court first defined **817 the term ‘banking game’ in People v. Carroll (1889) 80 Cal. 153, 157-158, 22 P. 129, accepting as ‘suffi-ciently accurate’ the definition given by a witness at trial: ‘ “[A] game conducted by *474 one or more persons where there is a fund against which everybody has a right to bet, the bank being responsible for the payment of all the funds, taking all that is won, and paying out all that is lost. The fund which is provided for that purpose is generally called the bank, and the person who conducts it the banker.” ’ With variations in phrasing, this definition has been accepted and applied by California courts in many cases since. (See, e.g., Tibbetts v. Van de Kamp [1990] 222 Cal.App.3d [389,] 393, 271 Cal.Rptr. 792; Sullivan v. Fox [, su-pra,] 189 Cal.App.3d 673, 678, 235 Cal.Rptr. 5; In re Lowrie (1919) 43 Cal.App. 564, 566, 185 P. 421.) As succinctly stated in People v. Ambrose (1953) 265 P.2d 191, 122 Cal.App.2d Supp. 966, 970:

Sept. 1998: Oliver v County of Los Angeles

“[Newjack] is not one of the games specifically mentioned in section 330. The question of its legality or illegality thus depends upon whether it qualifies as either a banking or a percentage game. This is an issue of law. [Citations.]” (Sullivan v. Fox) In the instant case, we expand this analysis and we now hold that a game will be determined to be a banking game if under the rules of that game, it is possible that the house, another entity, a player, or an observer can maintain a bank or operate as a bank during the play of the game. In Huntington Park, the trial court observed that the position of player-dealer in pai gow “continually and systematically rotates among each of the participants.” (Id. at p. 245.)

1982: Assembly v. Deukmejian , 30 Cal.3d 638

As stated by the California Supreme Court in Assembly of State of Cal. V. Deukmejian (1982) 30 Cal. 3d 638,655, “[A] referendum filed against the entirety of a statue stays that statute pending voter approval.” This California Supreme Court case was helpful during the 2007 compact referendum providing clarification on whether or not the compacts on referendum were or were not in effect. See letters in related items.

July 23, 1997: AG Lungren vs. Community Redevlop Agency of Palm Springs